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Abstract
Sorkin’s coevent interpretation [32, 31] shifts the focus of quantum logic from the structure
of a propositional lattice to the nature of truth valuations thereon. We apply this shift in
emphasis to a simple formulation of the consistent histories approach, expressing it in terms
of truth valuations which are brought together in a logical framework [14]. We see that these
consistent histories valuations are related to Sorkin’s multiplicative coevents, and that they
can be naturally described by an adaptation of Isham’s early topos-theoretic approach [24].
1 Introduction
1.1 Opening Comments
The histories approach to quantum mechanics began with the spacetime paths of
Dirac [3] and later Feynman [9, 10], and was subsequently generalised by Omnes
[26], Hartle [23] and Gell-Mann [12]. More recently, it has been rephrased as a
generalisation of probability theory in Sorkin’s quantum measure theory [29, 30].
However the interpretation has proved more elusive than the dynamics, leading
to a variety of lines of inquiry. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the consistent
histories interpretation [16, 17, 18, 19], the topos based analysis of which [24] has
led to a topos-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics [24, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2, 11, 25].
Alternatively, Sorkin’s coevent interpretation [32, 31, 27, 15, 8, 13, 20, 21, 22, 14]
has focused on truth valuation maps rather than the structure of the propositional
lattice.
1.2 Goals and Outline of this Paper
Much work in the study of quantum logic has been focused on the structure of the
propositional lattice associated with a physical theory, which in [14] we refer to as
the logical structure. Sorkin’s coevent approach [32, 31] shifts the focus onto truth
valuations; in particular the ‘non-classical’ nature of a physical theory is manifested
in the anhomomorphism of such valuations rather than (or in addition to) the non-
Boolean structure of the propositional lattice. This leads us to extend the idea of
a logical structure to that of a logical framework ; associating with the propositional
lattice Σ a truth value space T and a set of ‘allowed’ truth valuation functions V
from the lattice to this space, yielding a triple (Σ,V ,T) [14].
In this paper we will apply this focus on truth valuations to the consistent histories
approach. In section 1.3 we begin by reviewing the histories approach, in section 1.4
we consider interpretation, in particular consistent histories, Isham’s varying set
construction for consistent histories [24] and Sorkin’s coevents [32, 31]. In section 2.1
we rephrase the consistent histories approach in terms of truth valuations and develop
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a logical framework to describe them. In section 2.2 we consider how this might
relate to Sorkin’s coevent interpretation, particularly the multiplicative scheme, while
in section 2.3 we adapt Isham’s varying set construction to our valuation based
approach, building a new logical structure. We conclude in section 3.
1.3 The Histories Approach
1.3.1 Quantum Measure Theory
Sorkin’s quantum measure theory [29, 30] formulates the histories approach as a
generalisation of probability theory. A measure theory or histories theory is a triple
(Ω,Σ, µ) in which Ω is the sample space, Σ the event algebra and µ the measure. The
elements of the sample space are the maximally detailed descriptions of outcomes for
the system under examination, for example if we are considering a two tosses of a
standard coin we have Ω = {hh, ht, th, tt} where h = heads and t = tails, alternately
for describing the dynamics of a particle we might take Ω to be the set of spacetime
paths from a set starting point. The event algebra Σ ⊆ 2Ω is our propositional
lattice, with the lattice structure inherited from that of 2Ω, which in turn is defined
by set inclusion. The measure µ : Σ → R describes the dynamics, we require that
µ(A) ≥ 0 and µ(Ω) = 1. If µ obeys the Kolmogorov sum rule,
µ(A ⊔B) = µ(A) + µ(B) ∀ A,B ∈ Σ, (1)
where ⊔ denotes disjoint union, then it is a probability measure and (Ω,Σ, µ) a
probability theory. If the dynamics is already described by a decoherence functional1
D we set µ(A) = D(A,A) ∀A ∈ Σ. In general this leads µ to obey the quantum sum
rule,
µ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = µ(A ⊔B) + µ(B ⊔ C) + µ(C ⊔ A)
−µ(A)− µ(B)− µ(C), ∀A,B,C ∈ Σ (2)
We will call µ a quantum measure if it obeys (2), in which case we will denote (Ω,Σ, µ)
a quantum measure theory or simply a quantum theory. Notice that a probability
measure is a quantum measure, so that probability theories are a subset of quantum
theories.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, in what follows we will work with quantum
measure theories, and for simplicity will assume that the sample space is finite and
that Σ = 2Ω, so that the event algebra is Boolean2.
1.3.2 Partitions and Coarse Grainings
We refer to a partition Λ of Ω as a coarse graining; Λ generates the coarse grained
Boolean sublattice ΣΛ of Σ to which we can restrict the measure leading to the
coarse grained histories theory (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ). Further, we refer to Ω, Σ and (Ω,Σ, µ)
as fine grainings of Λ, ΣΛ and (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ) respectively. We follow [24] in denoting
the set of these coarse grained Boolean lattices3 by B, which we can make into a
poset using inclusion; ΣΛ1 ≤ ΣΛ2 iff ΣΛ1 ⊇ ΣΛ2 , so that ΣΛ1 is a fine graining of
ΣΛ2 . Now in some cases the restriction of the measure to a particular subalgebra ΣΛ
might obey the Kolmogorov sum rule, so that the coarse grained theory (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ)
is a probability theory. We call such subalgebras (and their associated partitions)
dynamically classical or decoherent, and denote the poset of such algebras (ordered
1The decoherence functional D : Σ×Σ→ C is the standard form of the dynamics in a histories
theory, for more details see for example [23]
2In what follows we will use the terms ‘Boolean algebra’ and ‘Boolean lattice’ interchangeably.
3Note that [24] uses B to refer to the poset of all Boolean sublattices, whereas we require such
algebras to be generated by a partition.
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by inclusion) by BD. Note that the decoherence of ΣΛ ∈ B implies the decoherence
of all coarse grainings of ΣΛ, so that BD ⊆ B is an upper set.
We may want to distinguish between decoherent partitions and the subset thereof
which, at least in principle, correspond to observable alternatives. Now the question
of what constitutes a physically observable event may be difficult to define appropri-
ately, and is not pertinent to what follows; we simply wish to avoid the assumption
that it coincides with inclusion in a decoherent set. Then without exploring how we
might concretely define this concept for a general histories theory, we will label the
poset of observable Boolean sublattices by BO ⊆ BD, and will simply require that
BO, like BD, should be an upper set. Continuing on this theme, we may wish to pick
out those partitions corresponding to experiments that have actually taken place, or
observations that have actually been made. Again, without going into what exactly
we mean by an experiment or an observation in a closed system we will denote the
corresponding poset by BE and require that it too should be an upper set.
1.4 Interpretation
1.4.1 Consistent Histories in Quantum Measure Theory
The interpretation of a probability theory is better understood than the interpreta-
tion of a quantum theory; the consistent histories approach [16, 17, 18, 19] therefore
seeks to restrict the interpretation of a quantum measure theory to the subsystems
which are (dynamically) classical, in other words to the elements of BD. Then in place
of a single propositional lattice Σ we will have a plethora of propositional lattices,
ΣΛ ∈ BD. The propositions within any element of BD can be logically compared
using the full toolbox of Boolean algebra, however propositions which are not con-
tained within a common element of BD are deemed incomparable. In other words we
keep the Boolean algebras ΣΛ ∈ BD but ‘throw away’ or ‘choose to ignore’ the larger
algebra Σ (unless of course Σ is itself decoherent). The decoherent subalgebras are
often referred to as consistent sets.
As an aside, note that in place of BD we might employ some concrete realisation of
BO or BE . In particular, the use of BE might perhaps be considered as the consistent
histories approach to an instrumentalist interpretation.
1.4.2 A Topos interpretation of Consistent Histories
The separation of propositions into incomparable sets may itself require some inter-
pretation. Isham addresses this issue by using topos theoretic structures to bring the
various consistent sets together into a single logical formalism [24]; this work may
be considered as a stand alone construction independent of the later and more far
reaching application of topos theory by Isham and Do¨ring [4, 5, 6, 7]. We will briefly
outline some key results of [24] which we will need further on, the reader is referred
to [1] for a more detailed description and an introduction to the relevant aspects of
topos theory. Starting with a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) we proceed in steps.
1. We construct the constant varying set △Σ in the topos SetsBD , which asso-
ciates Σ with each ΣΛ ∈ BD.
2. Note that the subobject classifier O in this topos is the association with each
ΣΛ ∈ BD of the set of upper sets in BD whose elements are all greater than or
equal to ΣΛ.
3. We construct the subobject SD which associates with each ΣΛ ∈ BD a set of
propositions which Isham refers to as accessible from ΣΛ [24],
SD(ΣΛ) = {A | ∃ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛ st A ∈ ΣΠ}. (3)
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Essentially this means that A is an element of at least one fine graining of ΣΛ,
or of ΣΛ itself.
4. We define the maps,
χSD
ΣΛ
: △Σ(ΣΛ) → O(ΣΛ)
χSD
ΣΛ
: A 7→ {ΣΠ ≥ ΣΛ | A ∈ SD(ΣΛ)}. (4)
Putting together χSD
ΣΛ
gives us the characteristic morphism χSD : △Σ→ O.
5. Given any event that is a member of a decoherent algebra, A ∈ ΣΛ ∈ BD, we
can use the characteristic morphism to define a corresponding global element
of the subobject classifier,
Γ〈A〉 : 1→ O, (5)
where 1 is the terminal object in SetsBD, which corresponds to the association
of a singleton set {•} with each ΣΛ ∈ BD (any singleton set will suffice up to
isomorphism). Then as a morphism Γ〈A〉 is defined by the family of maps,
Γ〈A〉ΣΛ : • 7→ χ
SD
ΣΛ
(A). (6)
6. We can use these global elements Γ〈A〉 to bring together the various propo-
sitional lattices ΣΛ ∈ BD into a single propositional lattice. The subobject
classifier is possessed of a natural Heyting algebra structure, so the set,
Γ〈Σ〉 = {Γ〈A〉 | ∃ΣΛ ∈ BD st A ∈ ΣΛ}, (7)
can be thought of as a subset of a Heyting algebra, and so will generate a
Heyting algebra H〈Σ〉. The reader is referred to [24] for further details.
1.4.3 Truth Valuations and a Logical Framework for Probability Theories
Rather than simply focusing on the structure of the propositional lattice, Sorkin has
emphasised the role of truth valuations thereon. In [31] Sorkin alludes to the ‘three-
fold character’ of logic; in [14] we formalised this notion to a triple (Σ,V ,T) which
we called a logical framework. The domain is the event algebra Σ, the space of truth
values T is generally (but not necessarily) a lattice, and the space of truth valuations
is the set of ‘allowed’ valuation maps φ : Σ → T. Note that strictly speaking, given
V both Σ and T are redundant since the definition of a map specifies its domain and
range; however we will continue to explicitly include them for emphasis.
When (Ω,Σ, µ) is a probability theory we typically use T = Z2, where we interpret
0 as ‘false’ and 1 as ‘true’; notice that Z2 is a Boolean lattice under the natural
ordering 0 < 1. The usual interpretation of a probability theory is that ‘one history
occurs’; labelling this real history as r we can construct a valuation map,
r∗ : Σ → Z2
r∗(A) =
{
1 r ∈ A
0 r 6∈ A
(8)
It is easy to check that such maps are lattice homomorphisms r∗ ∈ Hom(Σ,Z2), in
fact they are all of the lattice homomorphisms other than the zero map [13], which
we will exclude from Hom(Σ,Z2). Then for a classical probability theory (Ω,Σ,P)
our logical framework will be (Σ, Hom(Σ,Z2),Z2).
Now we may want to link our logical framework to the dynamics in some way;
perhaps the simplest means of doing so is Sorkin’s concept of preclusion [32], which
4
intuitively states that dynamically ‘disallowed’ events are logically ‘false’. More pre-
cisely this means that for a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) we wish to impose,
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0 ∀A ∈ Σ, φ ∈ V . (9)
This leads us to define,
C(Ω,Σ, µ) = {φ ∈ Hom(Σ,Z2) | µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0}, (10)
so that when µ is a probability measure we can use the logical framework (Σ, C(Ω,Σ, µ),Z2).
1.4.4 Coevents and the Multiplicative Scheme
It has been shown [8, 13] that there are gedanken experimentally realisable quantum
theories for which C(Ω,Σ, µ) = ∅, leading us to conclude that (Σ, C(Ω,Σ, µ),Z2) is
not in general a suitable logical framework for a quantum histories theory. Sorkin’s
coevents [32, 31] are a proposed generalisation in which the valuation maps may be
anhomomorphic. More precisely, given a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) a coevent is a
map,
φ : Σ→ Z2, (11)
which is not everywhere zero; we denote the set of all coevents by Σ⋄. A coevent
scheme is an assignment of a subset of Σ⋄ to every histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ); we think
of a coevent scheme as representing the ‘physically allowed’ set of truth valuations
for each histories theory.
A coevent is multiplicative [?] if it obeys,
φ(A ∧B) = φ(A) ∧ φ(B). (12)
We denote the set of multiplicative coevents associated with a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ)
by Σ∗. It is easy to see that the support φ−1(1) of a multiplicative coevent is a filter.
Since Σ is finite, we can define the map,
∗ : Σ∗ → Σ
∗ : φ 7→ φ∗, (13)
where φ∗ is the principal element of φ−1(1). We can extend this map to Σ ⊔ Σ∗ by
setting ∗ : A 7→ A∗ for all A ∈ Σ where,
A∗(B) =
{
1 A ⊆ B
0 A 6⊆ B
(14)
It is easy to see that (φ∗)∗ = φ, so that ∗ is an involution; because of this we can think
of ∗ as a duality. Comparison of multiplicative coevents A∗ with homomorphisms r∗
has lead to multiplicative coevents being considered as ‘ontological coarse grainings ’.
We say that a coevent is preclusive if it obeys (9), and that a coevent φ dominates
a coevent ψ if φ(A) = 1 ⇒ ψ(A) = 1 ∀A ∈ Σ. A coevent φ is minimal within a
set S ⊂ Σ⋄ of coevents if there does not exist ψ ∈ S such that ψ dominates φ. The
multiplicative scheme associates with a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) the set of coevents
that are minimal among preclusive multiplicative coevents [31, 13].
The purpose of minimality is to ensure that M(Ω,Σ, µ) = C(Ω,Σ, µ) whenever
the measure is classical (whenever µ is a probability measure), so that a dynamically
classical system will obey ‘classical logic’. However in practise we expect probability
theories to ‘emerge’ as the restriction of a quantum theory to a decoherent sublattice,
which suggests that we should look for some kind of ‘coevent classicality’ on such
sublattices ΣΛ ∈ BD. At the very least, to avoid conflict with observation we require
some form of ‘classicality’ in BE . To make this more precise, we say that a coevent
5
φ is classical on a partition Λ (or the boolean lattice ΣΛ generated by Λ) if φ maps
exactly one of the elements of Λ to one, which is equivalent to φ restricting to a (not
everywhere zero) homomorphism on ΣΛ.
Now it can be shown that coevents φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ) in the multiplicative scheme
are not in general classical on all decoherent partitions, leading to potential interpre-
tational difficulties. Sorkin [31] has suggested an alternate dynamical condition, that
of preclusive separability. A partition {Ai} (and the associated sublattice Σ{Ai}) is
preclusively separable for any measure zero set Z the intersections Ai ∩Z are also of
measure zero, for all i. We will write BP to denote the poset of preclusively separable
sublattices, it can me checked that BP is an upper set. It can be shown [13] that any
φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ) is classical on any preclusively separable partition; further, for any
preclusive homomorphism ψ ∈ C(Λ,ΣΛ, µ|Λ) on a preclusively separable partition Λ
there exists a φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ) which restricts to ψ on ΣΛ. Sorkin has argued [31, 28]
that any partition relating to a potential observation is preclusively separable, which
in our terminology means BP ⊆ BO.
2 Consistent Histories as Truth Valuations
2.1 A Logical Framework for Consistent Sets
Consistent histories focuses on the individual consistent sets, which in our terminol-
ogy are the dynamically classical sublattices. For any such ΣΛ ∈ BD the dynamics
restricts to a probability theory (Λ,ΣΛ, µΛ); the consistent histories approach directs
us to interpret this restricted theory on a ‘stand alone’ basis. Following the above, we
then construct the logical framework (ΣΛ, Hom(ΣΛ,Z2),Z2) to describe the system,
alternatively we might use (ΣΛ, C(Λ,ΣΛ, µ|Λ),Z2) if we wish to rule out dynamically
precluded valuations.
This leaves us with a logical framework for every dynamically classical partition.
In section 2.3 we will see how the partial order of BD can be used to bring these
frameworks into a single structure along the lines of Isham’s topos approach to con-
sistent histories [24]. However for now we will simply bring all the valuations together
by generalising our definition of a logical framework to be a triple (D,V ,T), where
D is a set of sublattices of Σ and each of the valuations in V now maps from one of
the elements of D to T. Then if (Ω,Σ, µ) is a probability theory the relevant logical
framework would be ({Σ}, C(Ω,Σ, µ),Z2), and if (Ω,Σ, µ) is a quantum theory the
multiplicative scheme would yield ({Σ},M(Ω,Σ, µ),Z2). Returning to consistent
histories approach, we therefore suggest the logical framework (BD,VD,Z2) where,
VD =
⋃
ΣΛ∈BD
Hom(ΣΛ,Z2). (15)
Alternatively if wish to rule out the dynamically precluded valuations at this stage
we would use (BD,VC ,Z2) where,
VC =
⋃
ΣΛ∈BD
C(Λ,ΣΛ, µ|Λ). (16)
2.2 Comparison with Multiplicative Coevents
We label by A∗
Λ
the valuation in Hom(ΣΛ,Z2) mapping A ∈ Λ to 1; note that A∗Λ is
unique and A∗
Λ
(B) = 0 for all B ∈ Λ such that B 6= A. Note also that the ‘partition
index’ Λ is necessary; A∗
Λ1
6= A∗
Λ2
since the two maps have different domains.
Now notice that,
supp(A∗Λ) = supp(A
∗), (17)
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where supp(φ) = φ−1(1) is the support of a Z2 valued map φ. In fact A
∗
Λ
is simply the
restriction of A∗ to the sublattice ΣΛ. This suggests a close link between consistent
histories and multiplicative coevents; we will examine two approaches to bringing
them together.
1. Adjust the multiplicative scheme to accommodate consistent histories
Given a histories theory (Ω,Σ, µ) we could use the consistent histories logical
framework to define a new coevent scheme. The most obvious way to do this
would be by extending A∗
Λ
to the multiplicative coevent A∗. This would yield
the coevent scheme,
ConsD(Ω,Σ, µ) = {A
∗ | ∃A∗Λ ∈ VD st supp(A
∗) = supp(A∗Λ)}. (18)
Notice that ConsD(Ω,Σ, µ) ⊆ Σ∗ so that ‘consistent histories coevents’ are
multiplicative. However they will not in general be preclusive; to remedy this
we can define,
ConsC(Ω,Σ, µ) = {A
∗ | ∃A∗Λ ∈ VC st supp(A
∗) = supp(A∗Λ)}. (19)
Note that if ∃Z ∈ Σ st µ(Z) = 0 and A∗(Z) = 1 then,
Z ∈ supp(A∗)
⇒ Z ∈ supp(A∗Λ)
⇒ Z ∈ ΣΛ. (20)
But then we have Z ∈ ΣΛ with µ|Λ(Z) = 0 and A∗Λ(Z) = 1, so A
∗
Λ
6∈
C(Λ,ΣΛ, µ|Λ). Therefore any A∗ ∈ ConsC(Ω,Σ, µ) is preclusive.
We might also choose to impose a minimality condition, for example we could
start with the set MPC of all multiplicative coevents that are both preclu-
sive and classical on every decoherent partition, and then choose the minimal
elements4 of MPC . We refer to these coevents as ConsM (Ω,Σ, µ).
Now ConsC(Ω,Σ, µ) and ConsM (Ω,Σ, µ) could be thought of as alternatives
to (or adjustments of) the multiplicative scheme M(Ω,Σ, µ). However in gen-
eral coevents in ConsC(Ω,Σ, µ) or ConsM (Ω,Σ, µ) will not be classical on all
classical partitions, and unlike the case of the multiplicative scheme we can not
even argue that they will be classical on observable lattices ΣΛ ∈ BO. Further,
we have no guarantee that ConsM (Ω,Σ, µ) will not be empty.
2. Adjust consistent histories to accommodate the multiplicative scheme
Perhaps the most elegant means of achieving this is to use BPD = BP ∩ BD in
place of BD, requiring a sublattice ΣΛ to be both decoherent and preclusively
separable if it is to be considered as a ‘consistent set’. We would then construct
the logical framework (BPD,VPD,Z2) where,
VPD =
⋃
ΣΛ∈BPD
Hom(ΣΛ,Z2), (21)
or the preclusive counterpart,
VPD =
⋃
ΣΛ∈BPD
C(Λ,ΣΛ, µ|Λ). (22)
In this framework, our results on preclusive separability (section 1.4.4 and
[13]) mean that any φ ∈ M(Ω,Σ, µ) will be classical on any ‘consistent set’
4The coevents that are not dominated by any other coevent in MPC , see section 1.4.4.
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ΣΛ ∈ BPD. Furthermore any A
∗
Λ
∈ VPD will be the restriction of some φ ∈
M(Ω,Σ, µ) to ΣΛ. This effectively combines the multiplicative scheme with
our consistent histories logical framework. However this will only be of interest
if we accept Sorkin’s argument [31] that BP ⊆ BO, and only if we are happy
with ‘non-classical logic’ on decoherent but not preclusively separable lattices.
2.3 Varying Sets for Valuations
We can adapt Isham’s treatment of consistent histories (section 1.4.2 and [24]) to
our valuation version thereof. This leads us to use the poset structure of BD to bring
together the logical frameworks (ΣΛ, Hom(ΣΛ,Z2),Z2) into a single construction
that may be viewed as an alternative to (BD,VD,Z2). Alternatively we might view
this as a process of adding structure to (BD,VD,Z2) based on the order relations
within BD.
If we were to follow Isham’s approach exactly for valuations, we would associate
with each element of BD the whole event algebra Σ to yield a constant varying set
which we label △∗Σ. We would then form the subobject S∗D where,
S∗D(ΣΛ) = {A
∗ | A ∈ SD(ΣΛ)}, (23)
from whence we can construct a valuation morphism and proceed as in section 1.4.2;
due to the duality between Σ and Σ∗ the resulting structures would be isomorphic
to those of section 1.4.2. However, the constant varying set △∗Σ seems intuitively to
be more like a description of multiplicative coevents than of our consistent histories
valuations. We therefore refine this construction to better fit consistent histories.
Instead of using a constant varying set, we will simply associate with each ΣΛ ∈
BD the valuations arising from the corresponding partition Λ. First we note that for
ΣΛ1 ,ΣΛ2 ∈ BD we have,
ΣΛ1 ≤ ΣΛ2 ⇔ ΣΛ1 ⊇ ΣΛ2 . (24)
It then can be checked that every map φ2 ∈ Hom(ΣΛ2 ,Z2) is the restriction to
ΣΛ2 of one or more maps φ1 ∈ Hom(ΣΛ1 ,Z2). Now although there may be many
φ1 ∈ Hom(ΣΛ1 ,Z2) corresponding to a given φ2 ∈ Hom(ΣΛ2 ,Z2), the restriction of
φ1 ∈ Hom(ΣΛ1 ,Z2) to ΣΛ2 is unique. This allows us to define the map,
VD12 : Hom(ΣΛ1 ,Z2) → Hom(ΣΛ2 ,Z2)
VD12(φ1) = φ1|ΣΛ2 . (25)
Then composing such maps, and writing VDi = Hom(ΣΛi ,Z2), for any pair ΣΛi ≤
ΣΛj we can define,
VDij : VDi → VDj
VDij(φi) = φi|ΣΛj . (26)
It can be checked that the assignment of VDi to each ΣΛi ∈ BD, together with the
maps VDij , forms a varying set over BD which we will denote △V . Note that △V is
not a constant varying set.
Intuitively, the ‘dual’ of △V would be the varying set associating the elements
of the partition Λ to each ΣΛ ∈ BD, together with the map sending A ∈ Λ to the
unique B ∈ Π satisfying B ⊇ A, where Π is a coarse graining of Λ (so that ΣΠ ≥ ΣΛ).
However this structure seems less natural than △V .
We can now adapt the subobject S∗D to our new construct. Because △
∗Σ asso-
ciates Σ∗ to each ΣΛ ∈ BD whereas △V associates Hom(ΣΛZ2) ⊆ Σ∗ to ΣΛ, it is
therefore natural to consider a ‘restriction’ of S∗D. With this in mind we define the
object RD in Sets
BD ,
RD(ΣΛ) = {A
∗
Π|ΣΛ | ∃ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛ st A
∗
Π ∈ Hom(ΣΠ,Z2)}, (27)
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together with the maps,
RDij : RD(ΣΛi) → RD(ΣΛj )
RDij : φi 7→ φi|ΣΛj , (28)
for ΣΛi ≤ ΣΛj . We check that RD is well defined; firstly it is easy to see that
ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛ ⇒ A∗Π|ΣΛ ∈ Hom(ΣΛ,Z2) = △V (ΣΛ). Secondly, we have,
RDij : RD(ΣΛi) 7→ {(A
∗
Π|ΣΛi )|ΣΛj | ∃ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛi st A
∗
Π ∈ Hom(ΣΠ,Z2)}. (29)
Since ΣΠ ⊇ ΣΛi ⊇ ΣΛj we have (A
∗
Π
|ΣΛi )|ΣΛj = A
∗
Π
|ΣΛj , so that,
RDij : RD(ΣΛi) 7→ {A
∗
Π|ΣΛj | ∃ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛi st A
∗
Π ∈ Hom(ΣΠ,Z2)}
⊆ {A∗Π|ΣΛj | ∃ΣΠ ≤ ΣΛj st A
∗
Π ∈ Hom(ΣΠ,Z2)}
= RD(ΣΛj ). (30)
Thus RD is a well defined object in Sets
BD .
It is also easy to check that RD is a subobject of △V . Firstly note that,
RD(ΣΛ) ⊆ △V (ΣΛ). (31)
Secondly we see that RDij is simply a restriction of △Vij to RD, by which we mean
that for φi ∈ RD(ΣΛi),
△Vij(φi) = φi|ΣΛj
= RDij(φj). (32)
In other words, the following diagram commutes for ΣΛi ≤ ΣΛj ,
RD(ΣΛi)
RDij
−−−−→ RD(ΣΛj )y
y
△V (ΣΛi) −−−−→
△Vij
△V (ΣΛj )
(33)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions. Thus RD is indeed a subobject of
△V .
We can then follow [24] to define a characteristic map χRD : △V → O as described
in section 1.4.2,
χRD
ΣΛ
: △V (ΣΛ) → O(ΣΛ)
φ 7→ {ΣΠ ≥ ΣΛ | φ|ΣΠ ∈ RD(ΣΠ)}, (34)
which we can use to define (not necessarily distinct) global elements,
Γ〈φ〉 : 1→ O, (35)
for each consistent histories valuation φ ∈ VD. Then we can use the Heyting algebra
structure of O to define the ‘lattice’ logical operations of meet and join on the set,
Γ〈VD〉 = {Γ〈φ〉|φ ∈ VD}. (36)
The closure of meet and join on Γ〈VD〉 will be a Heyting algebra [24], which we call
HD〈VD〉. The elements of HD〈VD〉 might best be thought of as propositions concern-
ing the dynamics µ of the underlying histories theory; in particular the ‘structure’ of
decoherence implied by µ. We have defined a map,
hD : VD → H〈VD〉
φ 7→ Γ〈φ〉, (37)
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which effectively ‘embeds’ the consistent histories valuations in a single logical struc-
ture.
It would of course be possible to replace the poset BD with BO or BE to yield
varying sets within the topoi SetsBO or SetsBE , leading us to embed the correspond-
ing sets of valuations in Heyting algebras HO〈VO〉 and HE〈VE〉 respectively. This
might be thought of as an instrumentalist version of the above analysis. Alternately,
we might use the poset BPD, which would lead to an accommodation between the
consistent histories approach and the multiplicative scheme, as described in section
2.2.
Finally, we might seek to extend the logical structure HD〈VD〉 to a logical frame-
work. Noting that Z2 is a Heyting algebra (as in every Boolean algebra), the most
obvious starting point would be (HD〈VD〉, Hom(HD〈VD〉,Z2),Z2); however we leave
this investigation to future research.
3 Summary and Conclusion
Our aim was to rephrase the consistent histories approach in terms of truth valu-
ations, following Sorkin’s development of the coevent interpretation. In section 2.1
we identified each consistent set with a logical framework (ΣΛ, Hom(ΣΛ,Z2),Z2),
where Λ is the corresponding partition. We then generalised our definition of a logi-
cal framework to bring the consistent sets together as (BD,VD,Z2), or as (BD,VC ,Z2)
if we wish to take preclusion into account. In section 2.2 we noted the close rela-
tion with multiplicative coevents given by supp(A∗
Λ
) = supp(A∗), and examined two
means of combing the approaches. This led us to introduce the coevent schemes
ConsD(Ω,Σ, µ), ConsC(Ω,Σ, µ) and ConsM (Ω,Σ, µ), as well as the logical frame-
work (BPD,VPD,Z2). In section 2.3 we adapted Isham’s early consistent histories
topos construction to our valuations based approach, moving from the constant vary-
ing set△Σ to the varying set△V while remaining within the topos SetsBD . We hope
that these results show that the consistent histories approach can be naturally de-
scribed in terms of valuations, opening links with Sorkin’s coevent interpretation and
facilitating a more simple description in terms of Isham’s varying set construction.
10
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